Populism, Democracy, and Redistribution

Christian Houle *
Paul D. Kenny†

September 2014

Abstract

While populist rule has become increasingly prevalent in the developing world, much of our knowledge about its implications for democracy remains anecdotal and contradictory. Although we might expect populist government to have negative implications for the rule of law, at least left-leaning populist rule should also be associated with greater democratic participation and socioeconomic redistribution. In this paper, we conduct the most comprehensive large-N cross-national test of the consequences of populist rule to date. Using data on 33 Latin American and Caribbean states, we find that populisms implications are mostly negative: (1) participation rates are not higher under populist governments or for populist campaigners; (2) populist regimes tend to erode the rule of law; and (3) populist rule, even under left wing populists, is associated with less redistribution than non-populist democratic rule. We further perform instrumental variable estimations and a quasi-experimental analysis to address the potential endogeneity of populism.

*Department of Political Science, Michigan State University (houlech1@msu.edu).
†Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University (paul.kenny@anu.edu.au)

In contemporary political theory, democracy is said to derive its legitimacy from two competing sources: *populism* and *republicanism* (Dahl 1989). Put another way, we might say that while democracy typically purports to reflect the will of the majority in some way, it also demands legal safeguards for minorities. But if the law functions to protect the rights of the already wealthy and powerful, a vital source of democratic legitimacy would seem to be lacking. It is under such circumstances that political actors claiming to represent democracy's popular face have intervened with great success. Populists like Chávez, Morales, and Menem have come to power by mobilizing the formerly disenfranchised poor with promises to restore true democracy. What is meant by such pledges is not always clear, but we can infer that while subsequent government performance under such populist campaigners (or *populist rule*) might be associated with the erosion of the rule of law on the one hand, we should see increased democratic participation and a fairer distribution of wealth on the other. In this paper, we ask: what have been the actual effects of populist rule on participation, the rule of law, and redistribution?

Much of the scholarly literature on populism to date has been focused on conceptual development rather than theory testing (Canovan 1999; Laclau 2005; Mudde 2004; Roberts 1995; Roberts 2007; Weyland 2003). Although a number of quantitative studies on the nature of public support for populists have been carried out (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Doyle 2011; Remmer 2011), the effects of subsequent populist rule on several facets of democracy have yet to be thoroughly tested. While this focus makes sense for the experience of populism in Western Europe, where the election of populists to executive office has been rare, in other regions populist success at the polls has been common enough to allow for an analysis of its effects.

Yet, empirically, what we know about the performance of populists in government tends to come from single country case studies or small-N comparisons. As a result, an aggregate picture is difficult to discern. For instance, in a recent edited volume, depending on the cases analyzed by individual contributors, quite different interpretations on

the implications of populism for democracy were put forward (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Some argued that populists can enhance participation in the democratic process by mobilizing segments of the population (e.g. the urban poor), who are often neglected by establishment parties (Roberts 2013). Others in contrast argued that populism's anti-institutional posture inevitably leads to the erosion of the rule of law and of democracy itself, while any substantive gains to the poor from greater participation are likely to be haphazard and impermanent (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Some recent quantitative research suggests that populist rule of the "new left" may be positively associated with redistribution, although it remains disputed whether the populist or social democratic left have in fact achieved greater gains (Birdsall, Lustig and McLeod 2011; Cornia 2012; Montecino 2012). This paper seeks to cut through these various debates with new data and a combination of analytical approaches.

This paper proceeds in three substantive sections followed by a conclusion. First we elaborate on the concepts of populism and populist rule, and discuss the relationship between them and the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy of interest to us. Second, we conduct the first comprehensive large-N cross-national test of the consequences of populist rule to date.[1] Using data on 33 Latin American and Caribbean states from 1981 to 2012, we find that populism's implications are mostly negative: (1) participation rates are not higher under populist governments or for populist campaigners; (2) populist regimes erode the rule of law; and (3) populist rule, even under left-wing populists, is associated with *less* redistribution than non-populist democratic rule. We further perform instrumental variable estimations and a quasi-experimental analysis to address the potential endogeneity of populism. In a third section, we discuss the implications of these results and account for some of the more counterintuitive findings with reference to some prominent cases of populism in the region.

Theoretical Considerations

We adopt a structural or organizational conceptualization and operationalization of populism. As an ideology, populism maintains that "politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004: 543). Populism thus stresses not individual or group rights but the rights of the people as a corporate body (Crick 2005: 626; Mudde 2004: 543; Panizza 2005; Shils 1956: 98). One way of operationalizing and measuring populism has been to focus on the pro-people and anti-elite rhetoric that flows from this ideology (Hawkins 2009). While the expression of such public sentiments is a key weapon in the populist toolkit, we find it less useful to focus primarily on political rhetoric in the classification of individual political actors as populist or not. Problematically, it's unclear using such an operationalization just how "populist" a political actor's rhetoric needs to be to cross what is essentially a subjective threshold. For some commentators, the expression of almost any popular sentiment is sufficient to categorize a politician as populist, leading to the inclusion of such mainstream politicians as Britain's Tony Blair into the populist club (Mair 2002).

Consequently, we focus more on the structural characteristics distinctive to populist movements that allow for a simpler and sharper operationalization. Populist movements are characterized by distinctive organizational structures and mobilization strategies that attempt to actualize the notion of popular sovereignty through a direct relationship between leader and supporter (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001). That is, populist movements are characterized by the presence of a flat and flexible organizational structure and top-down mobilization strategies that seek to cut-out intermediation between leader and follower.[2] We adopt Roberts' (2007: 5) definition of populism as "the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or 'the people'."[3] This conceptualization combines both the pro-people and anti-elite orientation of populist ideology and the distinctive organizational structure of populist movements. A populist is thus

a leader of a distinctively flat and centripetal institutional structure who relies on anti-establishment and anti-elite messages in her mobilization of mass constituencies.

Of course, the structures of populists' movements vary, with the likes of Fujimori's ephemeral party apparatuses at the extremely low end of the institutionalization scale on the one hand and the likes of Morales's more federated *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) organization on the other. Populist movements no doubt also change in structure over time both in and out of power. However, it still makes sense to distinguish populist movements as a distinctive type of political organization in which the leader – the populist – occupies an oversized role and in which the movement as a whole is pitched against the status quo.

In terms of outcome, we are interested in the effects of *populist rule*. By populist rule, we mean a government controlled by a populist who has been elected to executive office. While the outsider orientation of a populist in power is necessarily moderated from that of a populist campaigner, to varying degrees, populists in power continue to project an image of struggle against the status quo. The effect of populist rule on democracy has yet to be systematically tested. In this paper, rather than rely solely on aggregated measures of democracy (e.g. Polity IV), we follow the advice of Michael Coppedge (2012) to analyze the effect of populist rule on several discrete dimensions of democracy including both its procedural and substantive components. We break down the outcome of interest into three groups: democratic participation, the rule of law, and redistribution. We elaborate on the reasons for selecting these outcomes below.

Populism and Participation

Democracy is legitimized in large part by the claim that it approximates the general will to a greater degree than other forms of government. To accomplish this, democracy demands popular participation in the political process. Even within purely representative (rather than direct) democratic regimes, the implication is that higher levels of participa-

tion in elections are good for democracy. By mobilizing the formerly disenfranchised poor against the elite, populism implies greater popular participation in politics and should be democracy-enhancing (Avritzer 2002).

One of the cases informing this positive view of popular participation under populism is Venezuela (Cannon 2009). Hugo Chávez consistently won national-level elections with substantial majorities of the vote and introduced a range of local-level participatory democratic institutions. However, as we discuss below, the aggregate impact of Chávez's populist rule has been ambiguous (Mainwaring 2012). At the same time that populists look to mobilize their supporters, they also face the temptation to suppress the mobilization of opponents. Moreover, the fact that populists like Chávez and Fujimori initially came to power on the back of widespread disillusionment with their nation's party systems and low voter turnouts raises the possibility that populist success may be more the product of a committed minority rather than a silent majority. The first hypotheses we test therefore concern participation rates in the democratic process:

H.1. Elections for executive and legislative office under populist rule are associated with higher voter turnout.

H.2. Elections for executive office in which populists are successful are associated with higher voter turnout.

Participation in national level elections is a useful metric for comparative analysis. However, much of the discussion with respect to participation has to do with local level institutions. While we do not have a way to address this in the statistical analysis we tend to this issue in the discussion section in light of some qualitative evidence.

Populism and the Rule of Law

The second component of democracy we explore is the procedural one. We follow the view of several prominent democratic theorists who argue that a central justification of democracy is its ability to prevent *domination*. That is, democracy is less an institutional mechanism that brings about policies in line with the average citizen than it is one that makes it more difficult for one group to exercise perpetual domination over another (Przeworski 1999; Shapiro 1999; Weingast 1997). It is in this context that the rule of law takes on particular importance. We are not claiming that the law has an exogenous effect in ensuring minority rights or in ensuring the ability of the people to peaceably remove an unpopular government from power. The law is often used to preserve and enhance the wealth and power of the elite (Loffredo 1993). However, an effective rule of law does imply that government exercises its power according to principles and regulations rather than to arbitrary and mutable criteria. In turn, the violation of these impartiality principles signals the presence of domination and provides a basis on which that domination can be challenged.

Populists often explicitly contend that they are not bound by the constitutional and legal order (Urbinati 1998). Rather, populists base their legitimacy on a substantive notion of democracy. As a result, the very idea of equal legal citizenship is played down in populist discourse. The claim that a minority of individuals should be able to prevent the implementation of a policy favored by a majority is anathema to populism; this is particularly so when that minority is an oligarchy but we see in populism's more ethnonationalist manifestations that it can be directed against a range of out-groups (Mudde 2007). In any case, the more direct or participatory justification of democracy common to populism should make populist politicians much more likely to erode the rule of law once in office than non-populists.

H.3. Populist rule is negatively associated with the rule of law.

Populism and Redistribution

Here we push the analysis to democracy's more substantive aspects (Heller 2000). The notion that the more plebiscitary a regime the more it should favor the interests of the poor is a standing intuition in political economy going back to classical thought. Looking to mobilize the common people against an elite that's usually portrayed in oligarchic terms, it stands to reason that populists should be exercised to redistribute wealth and income to the lower social orders when in power. Indeed, early work on populism associated the phenomenon with high levels of deficit spending on social transfers and other developmental policies (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). However, with the emergence of a new class of populists in the 1990s, who combined traditional techniques of populist organization and mobilization with neoliberal economic policy, the connection between populism and redistributive social policy has become less clear (Weyland 2003).

Nevertheless, excluding such neopopulist government, we might expect that at least left-wing populist rule would be associated with higher levels of redistribution than that of other governments and hence a reduction in socioeconomic inequality (Birdsall, Lustig and McLeod 2011; Cornia 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012; Montecino 2012). But because the 2000s saw a general reduction in inequality across the region that has been attributed to a variety of forces including a positive global economic environment (López-Calva and Lustig 2010), we need to determine the extent to which any reduction in socioeconomic inequality was attributable to populist rule per se (see the debates in Blofield 2011; Cornia 2014).

H.4. Populist rule is positively associated with progressive redistribution.

Empirical Analysis

In order to ensure that our units of analysis are comparable while still maintaining some medium range generalizability, we restrict the analysis to Latin American and Caribbean states in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As the majority of conceptual, theoretical, and empirical research on populism has been directed to understanding the political dynamics of this region, focusing here allows us to directly engage with other researchers working on these issues. Future research might extend this approach to other regions where populist rule has been reasonably common (e.g. Southeast Asia).

The Data

We follow David Doyle's (2011) classification of populist candidates in his recent empirical analysis of populism in Latin America. Doyle relies on a two-part coding strategy. First, he determined whether individual candidates belong to political organizations coded as populist by Michael Coppedge (2007) and Grigore Pop-Eleches (2009). Their coding is based on a classification of particular parties as being personalistic and without a rigid organizational structure or support base. Second, where the leaders of such personalistic parties behave in correspondence with Robert's (2007: 5) definition of populism quoted above as "the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or 'the people'", Doyle codes them as populist. We followed the same strategy to expand Doyle's dataset to include more recent years and the countries of the Caribbean. Episodes of populist rule (i.e. populists who were elected to executive office) in the period from 1981-2012 are shown in Table A1 of the online appendix.

Below we compare the performance of populist governments with respect to participation, the rule of law, and redistribution to both non-populist democratic and authoritarian governments. Note that populists are identified by the nature of their campaigns

rather than by the nature of their subsequent actions in power. The approach thus also allows us to code as a separate category candidates who were unsuccessful at the polls but who can also be classified as populist. We exploit this feature of the coding strategy to allow for a comparison between populist rule and instances in which populists *almost* came to power.

Our quantitative analysis is divided into three main parts. First, we test whether populism is associated with higher participation. Our unit of analysis is the election for executive and legislative office. Following the approach of Altman and Pérez-Linan (2002), we take the percentage turnout of voting age population in first round elections from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance as our main indicator of participation. We also use the percentage turnout of registered voters, but as many of the states in the region have compulsory voting, there is not a great deal of difference between the two (available upon request). We address some other aspects of participation that are not as easily comparable across cases in the discussion section.

The second set of outcomes relates to the procedural quality of democracy. If the popular dimension of democracy is captured by direct participation, its republican component is captured by the degree to which constraints on domination function. For this we are concerned primarily with the rule of law. There is no single observable outcome or indicator that adequately captures all aspects of the rule of law. Thus, here we test the model against a range of measures. First, for the rule of law, we use the World Bank Governance Index indicator (*Rule of Law*) that measures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, e.g., incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. It is a composite indicator that draws on a wide range of survey-based source material (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010).[4]

In addition, in order to compensate for the number of missing values in this series we have also used additional dependent variables. *Constraints on the Executive* from Polity

IV, which while conceptually broader than the World Bank measure, has more complete coverage so is useful in this respect. This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. Put another way, it refers to the full range of institutionalized checks and balances on executive power or domination. As a result this measure has often been used to gauge the rule of law in cross-national studies (Boix 2011; Keefer and Knack 2002).

Of particular interest to us is the relationship between the executive and the judiciary, although this component is not separated out in either index. Thus, we have to make the inference that regimes in which institutions like the legislature, ombudsmen, or other agencies or non-governmental organizations can function as a check on executive power are generally also those in which the autonomy of the judiciary is respected. To capture the latter more precisely, we also use two measures of the independence of the judiciary. The first one, denoted *Independence of the Judiciary (CIRI)*, is taken from Cingranelli and Richards (2010). This measure estimates the extent of political interference with the operation of the courts. If the latter are not free to apply the rule of law equally and fairly but instead politically, then the quality of the rule of law is clearly eroded. Our second measure, *Independence of the Judiciary (L&S)*, is the indicator developed by Linzer and Staton (2012). Linzer and Staton (2012) use an item response theory (IRT) model to estimate the independence of the judiciary as a latent variable.

Beyond these more procedural measures, we also attempt to distinguish governments based on their respect for particular legal rights. Here we concentrate on the freedom of the press and on rights of integrity of person and property. Press freedom is of interest because it is said to act as a check on potentially arbitrary or unjust government behavior. To measure the *Freedom of the Press* we rely on the indicator from the Freedom House. It provides a measure of the extent to which the print, internet and broadcast media are free and independent from the state. This indicator covers all countries included in the sample during the full period.

The security of the person from arbitrary physical harm at the hands of the state is of obvious importance to a functioning democracy. To measure *Human Rights*, we use the Political Terror Scale (US State Department). The scale goes from 1 to 5, with 1 representing countries under a secure rule of law, in which political imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial assassination are extremely rare to 5 in which the application of terroristic methods has expanded to a large part of the population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. Where civilians can be molested by the forces of the state in an arbitrary way without any legal recourse, the rule of law may be said to no longer apply. As with other indices, there is an element of subjectivity in its construction.

For comparative purposes, we also use the indicator of *Physical Integrity* to capture the abuse of physical human rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). The latter is a composite index that is constructed on the basis of the observation of the prevalence of torture, extrajudicial killings, political incarceration, and disappearances. As with the *Human Rights* measure, these capture the most egregious violations of the rule of law.

Finally, while not rising to the level of infringement as the two latter measures, for many, respect for property rights is fundamental to the functioning of liberal democracy. If the state is free to confiscate or interfere with the property of citizens, the latter's freedom is greatly eroded. At the very least, citizens could be silenced in their criticism of government for fear of losing their means of living. Although confiscatory levels of taxation on income or inheritance inhibit individual autonomy with respect to property, so long as the rules regarding such taxes are applied equally across the citizenry regardless of political connections, they are not said to be interfering with the rule of law. Thus, highly redistributive social democracies are compatible with full respect for property rights. To capture the extent of arbitrary disrespect for *Property rights* we use the Heritage Foundation's property rights index. This index is especially useful as it also analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of

individuals and businesses to enforce contracts through the courts. Respect for property rights also relates to the issue of redistribution, which is our next outcome of interest.

Our third outcome of interest is redistribution. Measures of redistribution based on fiscal policy are useful but can be deceptive. Although in theory expenditure on education, healthcare, and welfare should be redistributive, in already highly unequal societies, the beneficiaries are often found among those of higher socioeconomic status (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Moreover, public expenditure may be used inefficiently and often fails to reach the poor (Ross 2006).

Instead, we take advantage of a Gini coefficients dataset recently made available by Solt (2009, 2013). Solt (2009, 2013) provides indicators of market inequality (pre-tax and transfer inequality) and net inequality (post-tax and transfer inequality). We measure redistribution as the proportion change between the pre- and post-tax/transfer Gini coefficients of a country during a given year:

$$Redistribution_{i,t} = \frac{Gini_{pre_{i,t}} - Gini_{post_{i,t}}}{Gini_{pre_{i,t}}}$$

where $Gini_{pre_{i,t}}$ is the pre-tax/transfer Gini coefficient (market inequality) and $Gini_{post_{i,t}}$ the post-tax/transfer Gini coefficient (net inequality) in country i and year t.

Higher values indicate higher levels of (progressive) redistribution. A negative value implies that the post-tax/transfer Gini coefficient of a country is higher than its pre-tax/transfer Gini coefficient; meaning that redistribution is regressive. Contrary to authors relying on other measures, like public spending or the tax rate, this indicator clearly distinguishes between progressive and regressive redistribution. Other authors have also relied on the difference between pre- and post-tax/transfer inequality to measure redistribution, albeit not to study populism (e.g., Kenworthy and Pontusson 2009).

Contrary to recent authors such as Montecino (2012), we do not use change in the Gini coefficients over time because affecting the Gini coefficient of a country takes a long

period of time, making it difficult to estimate the effect of the current regime on inequality. Moreover, the overall Gini coefficient can be affected by a multitude of factors other than the regime, whereas the difference between the market and net Gini coefficients of a country is exclusively driven by taxes and transfers.

The analysis also includes the following control variables: GDP per capita logged (World Bank 2013), growth rates, a dummy variable for autocracies (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010), and ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003). Models on participation control for whether a state has compulsory voting (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2014). In order to account for the possibility that more unequal countries redistribute more (see Meltzer and Richard 1981), all models on redistribution control for the pre-tax/transfer Gini coefficient (Solt 2009, 2013).[5] Table A2 of the online appendix provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.

Analysis and Results

The first outcome of interest is participation. The average turnout for executive elections in populist regimes is 67.3 percent. This is slightly lower than in non-populist democracies (68.5 percent), although the difference is not statistically significant. Table 1 reports the effect of populism on participation rates in executive and legislative elections, along with robust standard errors.[6] Elections held in autocracies are omitted from the sample. Therefore, the estimates compare the effect of populism on participation relative to non-populist democracies.

[Table 1 about here]

Columns 1-2 (executive elections) and 5-6 (legislative elections) test whether elections that were held while a populist party was in power have higher turnouts than those held in non-populist democracies (H.1). Note that the election may or may not have been ultimately won by a populist party. These models enable us to account for the possibility

that populist parties are only able to widely mobilize the masses when they have access to state resources.

Columns 3-4 (executive elections) and 7-8 (legislative elections) instead look at elections that were won by a populist party (H.2). In these cases, a populist party may have been in power at the time of that election but need not have been. In all instances, populism is found to have little effect on participation. Indeed, the direction of the effect is *negative* in most cases, although the results are not statistically significant. In sum, populist government or participation in an election seems as likely to suppress as to increase participation at the national level.

A possible explanation for this non-finding is that only some types of populists encourage participation. For example, one may believe that left-leaning populists, such as Chávez, are more likely to increase participation than right-leaning populists like Collor de Mello or Menem. Therefore, using information on the ideology of political parties from the updated Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001), we have classified all populist regimes as leftists, rightists or centrists. Table A3 of the online appendix shows that left populists are not associated with higher levels of participation relative to non-populist democracies.

[Figure 1 about here]

We now turn to the effect of populism on the different indicators of the rule of law (H.3). For comparability, all indicators are normalized between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates the highest performance with the given right (e.g., in the case of *Constraints on the Executive*, it means that the Polity IV assigns the highest level of executive constraint score). As illustrated in Figure 1, populist governments receive substantially lower scores for all rule of law indicators than non-populist democracies; for several indicators, they even receive lower scores than autocracies.

[Table 2 about here]

As indicated in Table 2, populism is associated with a decrease in the rule of law for all indicators, even when additional controls are included. Here the baseline is non-populist democracy and a clear deterioration in the rule of law under populist government is evident for *Rule of Law*, *Executive Constraints*, *Judicial Independence*, *Freedom of the Press*, and *Physical Integrity* indicators. The size of the effect is of course difficult to interpret with indices such as this. However, the signs of the coefficients run in the predicted direction and each is statistically significant at the one or five percent level.

While we find that the negative effect of populist government on the rule of law is greater than for autocratic government, this may be a result of the way in which compliance with the rule of law is measured for non-democratic regimes. In addition, even though authoritarian rule has a somewhat stronger negative effect on performance on human rights measures, the fact that this relationship does not stand out even more clearly is likely a result of the time period covered in our dataset. For the most part, it excludes the violently repressive military regimes in Latin America in the 1970s.

The effect of populism on *Human Rights* and *Property Rights* is weaker than its effect on the other indicators. It is important to notice that while these two indicators measure two particular types of rights, our other indicators, with the exception of *Freedom of the Press*, more directly capture the overall quality of the rule of law.

However, it is possible that the weakness of the findings is driven by the fact that different types of populist regimes have different effects on these two types of rights. Hardline populists like Fujimori or Uribe, for example, may erode human but not property rights, while those like Chávez or Morales may do the opposite. Therefore, in Table A6 of the online appendix we test the effect of right and left populism on human and property rights. We find that right populists indeed erode *Human Rights* and *Physical Integrity* but not *Property Rights*, while left populists harm only the latter. This suggests that while populists across the board erode the rule of law, they do so to different ends according to their policy preferences and bases of support.

In Table A7 of the online appendix, we further show that the election of a populist party leads to the erosion of the quality of democracy more generally. We measure the level of democracy with the freedom house score and the polity score. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects. Of course, such composite indices are themselves problematic, so these findings should be interpreted with caution.

In terms of the possible confounding variables, we find that overall development (as measured by GDP per capita logged) is positively correlated with some rule of law indicators but that negative economic growth is not associated with any deterioration in performance on these indicators. We do, however, find that ethnic fragmentation is associated with lower performance on rule of law indicators. Ethnic fragmentation is not associated with the greater likelihood of populist electoral success, but it is possible that ethnically fragmented states may be more prone to the erosion of the rights of ethnically defined minorities (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). The precise mechanism behind this latter finding requires further investigation.

[Table 3 about here]

Finally, Table 3 tests the effect of populism on redistribution (H.4). Remember that our measure of redistribution captures the change in the level of inequality before and after tax and transfers. Model 1 suggests that, contrary to our expectations, populist governments actually redistribute *less* than non-populist democracies. The relationship is highly statistically significant. These results contradict the findings of some (e.g., Montecino 2012) but not all (e.g., McLeod and Lustig 2011) previous authors.

Again, this counterintuitive finding could be driven by right-wing populist governments, like the one of Fujimori. Therefore, in column 2, we distinguish between left, right and center populist governments. The findings show that, although right-wing populists indeed redistribute less than those on the left, even the latter adopt levels of redistribution that are significantly lower than non-populist democracies. Column 3 only includes left governments and again shows that left populists redistribute less than left democracies.

Lastly, in model 4 we exclude left-wing democracies. Surprisingly, left-leaning populists are found to redistribute less than right and center democracies.

Results on the control variables are consistent with our expectations. Richer countries redistribute more, presumably because they have the capacity to do so more efficiently. As argued by Alesina and Glaeser (2004), ethnic fractionization reduces redistribution. Consistent with most previous empirical tests, moreover, there is little evidence that more inequality actually leads to more redistribution (e.g., see Perotti 1996; Moene and Wallerstein 2001).

Robustness Checks

We now perform a series of additional robustness tests. It may be that states in which populists are elected are already experiencing the kind of deterioration in political stability that would be associated with lower outcomes on the rule of law indices on which we rely. That is, it may be a decline in the rule of law that encourages people to abandon conventional parties and elect a populist outsider in the first place (Tanaka 1998). The same is true for participation and redistribution. Populist parties may be more likely to emerge when the population is disillusioned with a democracy and thus unlikely to participate, or when the regime fails to redistribute toward the poor.

We perform two additional sets of analyses aimed at addressing the issue of endogeneity. First, we run instrumental variable estimations using the autonomy of subnational political units (*Autonomy*) as an instrumental variable for populist government. AUTHOR (2013) finds that the introduction of elections at the subnational level is a robust predictor of populist success, controlling for a variety of other institutional, social, and economic variables.

The causal mechanism linking decentralized political authority to populist success is based on its role in precipitating the decline of patronage-based incumbent parties. With decentralization, subnational units of patronage-dependent parties are more likely to de-

fect, precipitating party system collapse, and opening up the space for populists to come to power. Unlike economic predictors of populism such as hyperinflation or economic crisis, we think it is unlikely that decentralization would be causally associated with a decline in the rule of law, a decrease in political participation, or a lack of redistribution other than through its effect on the likelihood of populist electoral success (Crook and Manor 1998; Goldfrank 2011; c.f. Treisman 2007).

The main measurement of subnational authority used in the regression analyses comes from the *Institutions and Elections Project* (IAEP) (Regan and Clark 2010), which has been updated by AUTHOR (2013). We use AUTHOR's binary coding of whether or not subnational representatives are appointed, elected, or otherwise chosen autonomously from the central government. Based on a combination of primary and secondary sources, we then extended the dataset to include additional years (up to 2012) and additional cases (in the Caribbean). First stage regressions, presented in Tables A22 and A23 of the online appendix, show that *Autonomy* is not a weak instrument of populism (see section 2 of the online appendix for more detail).

[Table 4 about here]

[Table 5 about here]

We follow the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002: 623-25) to deal with regressions in which the first stage is nonlinear (we use a probit) and the second is linear. We use a probit model to first estimate the effect of *Autonomy* on the likelihood that a populist party takes power. We then use the predicted values as instruments (not regressors) in the second stage (see section 2 of the online appendix for more detail).

Results are reported in Tables 4 (participation) and 5 (rule of law and redistribution) (see Tables A22 and A23 of the online appendix for the first stage regressions). Our main results are unchanged. Populism does not enhance participation. Moreover, populist democracies perform significantly worse than non-populist democracies in terms of rule

of law, judicial independence (when using the CIRI indicator), freedom of the press, human rights and physical integrity. The only findings that change with the use of the instrumental variable are those for *Executive Constraints* and *Judicial Independence (L&S)*. The effects are in the predicted direction as before but are not statistically significant. Finally, redistribution remains significantly lower when a populist party holds office (Table 5, Column 9).

Even though first stage regressions suggest that *Autonomy* is not a weak instrument for populism, Tables 4 and 5 also report Anderson-Rubin tests of the statistical significance of populism. The Anderson-Rubin test is robust to the use of weak instruments. Anderson-Rubin tests suggest that populism is not associated with higher levels of participation, that it erodes the rule of law and that it lessens redistribution.

As with most instruments, this one is not perfect. There may still be something unique about the political and social circumstances in which populists get elected that makes them more prone to problems with the rule of law, participation and redistribution. Therefore, we also adopt a second strategy to address the issue of endogeneity in the rule of law and redistribution models. Here we exploit a kind of "quasi-experiment" to overcome this problem (Dunning 2012). Because populism is operationalized according to the structure of leaders' parties and the way in which they conducted their electoral campaigns, we can see if there is a statistically significant difference in our outcomes between those states in which populists got elected and those in which they almost got elected. If a *potentially* declining rule of law situation or a failure to redistribute explained populist success, we should see no significant difference between these subsets of cases.[7]

We look at all cases in which populist campaigners obtained over 20 percent of the first round vote, and compare the rule of law and redistribution in those cases where they come to power to those cases where they do not. Table A8 of the online appendix assesses whether the conditions prior to the elections were similar in democracies in which populist parties were elected (treatment group) and those in which populist parties were

almost elected (control group). Results suggest that the initial conditions were similar for the treatment and control groups. They had similar rule of law and redistribution levels and similar values on the control variables. In fact, the only two significant differences are that countries in which populist parties barely failed to gain office are found to be poorer and more ethnically diverse – two conditions found to be harmful to the rule of law and redistribution – than those in which they succeeded. Therefore, initial conditions cannot explain why countries in which populist parties were elected did worse than those in which they almost got elected.

[Table 6 about here]

Table 6 presents the results of a difference of means test for all indicators between states under populist government and those governments that just beat a populist opponent. For all indicators of the rule of law, populist governments perform lower than those in which populists were almost elected, even though, as shown in Table A8, they arrive to power under similar conditions. The results are statistically significant even for human and property rights. We believe this strongly supports the theoretical claim that there is something about populist government per se that harms the rule of law, not simply some underlying socioeconomic or security conditions that makes the election of a populist and the erosion of the rule of law simultaneously more likely. Although populist governments redistribute less than those in which populist parties were almost elected, the difference is not significant. This shows that democracies in which populist parties almost came to power but ultimately failed do not redistribute less than those in which populist parties won.

Additional robustness tests are reported in the online appendix. Tables A9-A11 of the online appendix redo Tables 1-3 with control variables for oil revenues (Ross 2013) and inflation (World Bank 2013) and decade dummy variables.[8] Tables A12-A14 add country fixed effects. In order to make sure that our results are not driven by outliers, we reproduce model 2 of Table 1 (Table A15), model 4 of Table 1 (Table A16), model 1 of Table

2 (Table A17) and model 1 of Table 3 (Table A18) while excluding each populist regime in succession. This also enables us to be confident that our results are not caused by the classification of any particular leader as populist. Finally, Tables A19-A21 replicate Tables 1-3 without the Caribbean. Results are robust.

Discussion

Populism and Participation

In this section we interpret the results above and discuss them in light of some prominent cases of populist government. The first task is to explain why the theorized positive correlation between populism and democratic participation fails to show up. Part of the explanation for this finding is that populists often come to power amid deep popular dissatisfaction with a country's incumbent parties. But even after taking office, populists have often failed to enhance participation.

A typical example here is Peru. Peru's party system, with American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) on the center-left and Accion Popular (AP) on the right, imploded in the late 1980s amidst a dual economic and security crisis. Fujimori won the 1990 Presidential election against the conservative candidate, Mario Vargas Llosa, with a then-novel combination of neoliberalism and populism, or *neopopulism* (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2003). Yet Fujimori's election and time in office was not associated with increased popular participation. In fact, the 1990 presidential election had a turnout of only 66.3 percent of the voting age population, a figure that remained substantially the same (66.4 percent) for his 1995 reelection. This is in contrast to a turnout of 73.4 percent in the 1985 presidential election and 78.6, 83.2 percent and 86.2 percent in the 2001, 2005, and 2010 elections respectively.[9]

Like Peru, Venezuela also experienced a crisis of its democratic institutions in the late 1980s. The failure of the economy in the 1980s led to widespread disenchantment with

the two main parties, the *Acción Democrática* (AD) party and the *Christian Comité de Organización Política Elctoral Independiente* (COPEI), which after 1973 had controlled about 90 percent of the vote between them (Ellner 2003: 8). This opened up the space for Hugo Chávez to come to power in 1999 on a populist ticket. Like Fujimori, Chávez was initially elected in 2000 on the back of low turnout of the voting age population (52 percent) compared to turnouts in the 1980s of over 70 percent.[10] However, unlike Fujimori, for Chávez's reelections, this figure rose to 76.4 percent and 82.0 percent in 2006 and 2012 respectively. In sum, for both right and left leaning populists, their initial success is deeply interwoven with a deep dissatisfaction with the party system that also functions to depress voter turnout.

Following the initial election of a populist, the picture becomes even less clear. While some populists look to promote the mobilization of the poorer classes others appear to repress it. In Peru, Fujimori made no effort to increase mass involvement in local institutions. On the contrary, following his initial election Fujimori moved quickly to recentralize power in the executive by eliminating the subnational levels of elected government created by his predecessor and replacing them with appointed councils called *Concejos Transitorios de Administración Regional* (CTAR) (Barr and Dietz 2006). His mobilization of the poor was strategically controlled from above and designed to limit rather than enhance popular participation.

This was evidently not the case in Venezuela, where voter turnouts were consistently high during Chávez's tenure in office. Chávez also regularly utilized national referenda that brought an element of direct democracy to Venezuela for the first time. Moreover, Chávez also looked to expand participation in a way not captured in voter turnout statistics. Chávez argued that democracy meant that people should participate in the processes of governing, rather than being left dependent on political representatives. He introduced a number of local level institutions to mobilize the formerly disenfranchised population of urban and rural poor, women, and indigenous groups. Bolivarian Circles, and subse-

quently the *Missiones* empowered local civil society organizations to take over the administration of services from health to education to land reform. Subsequently, community councils acquired a major role in the planning of public works and other activities.

Ultimately, even in the Venezuelan case, the implications of populism for participation have been ambiguous. First, we have to consider the extent to which subnational democratizing dynamics were in play prior to Chávez's election. The local political movements, which would form the bulk of Chávez's support base in the 2000s, were formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to the perceived failures of the existing political system. That is, while Chávez's accession to power did coincide with an uptick in the visibility of local organizations, many of these in fact preceded his election (Salamanca 2004).

Second, as Hawkins (2010) has found, while participation among the poor and socially excluded increased through local institutions like the Communal Councils and the *Missiones*, most of the individuals involved were active Chávez supporters. The Councils may have in fact impeded true popular participation, by making involvement conditional on sharing the ideological commitments of the government (Trivino Salazar 2013). As Ciccariello-Maher (2013) documents, many of the more prominent local organizations perceived not only opportunities to organize under the Chávez government but also the prospect of cooptation and even repression.

Participation was thus incentivized in a highly selective way in order to advance partisan interests. We suggest that this dynamic is inherent to the majoritarian logic of populism. In sum, at best the Chávez government proved a mixed blessing, even in terms of democratic participation. We see these countervailing dynamics replicated across the spectrum of populist governments in the region with the result that no unambiguous relationship between populism and participation can be easily discerned.

Populism and the Rule of Law

The results presented above were unambiguous on this count. Populist government is negatively associated with respect for the rule of law. Given that the rule of law is almost by necessity associated with the maintenance of the status quo, this relationship makes complete sense. The way in which each of our indicators for the rule of law, constraints on executive power, and even rights to property and physical integrity are constructed leaves open the possibility that they are endogenous to populist rule itself. That is, the perception in the West that Chávez and Fujimori were populists and the consequent association of populism with anti-democratic behavior may have colored the coding of these indicators. Without having witnessed the coding process for these variables we cannot rule this possibility out conclusively. However, a reading of the historical material of these and other cases of populist rule suggests that the findings are valid.

Not only did Fujimori repress popular involvement in government by centralizing political power, but he also sought to remove a range of other constraints on the executive branch. On coming to power as an outsider, Fujimori had only a small minority of his Change 90 supporters in the legislature. As a result, he governed largely by fiat in his first year in office. The Senate in turn censured the President and made attempts to impeach him. In 1993, Fujimori prorogued the Congress in response, effectively executing an *autogolpe*. Facing criticism primarily from abroad, Fujimori moved to formally reestablish democratic institutions and he called for the election of a Constituent Assembly (CA) that would draw up a new constitution for Peru.

Fujimori used his dominance over the selection of the CA to push through a constitution that concentrated power in the executive. The 1993 constitution curtailed power of the legislature, creating a single chamber 120-member, nationally-elected body to replace the 240-member two chamber legislature of the previous era. In a violation of judicial autonomy, justices were removed virtually *en masse* and then replaced with appointees beholden to the government. The state's investigative and security apparatus was also

radically enhanced and at the same time made subordinate to the government.

Although Chávez came from a different end of the ideological spectrum to Fujimori, it is striking how similarly the two presidents behaved with respect to the other institutions of the state. Although Chávez was freely elected with a majority of votes in 1998, like Fujimori he initially faced a divided legislature that opposed him on many aspects of his policy agenda. Shortly after his election, Chávez issued a presidential decree calling for a referendum on the election of a new CA that would rewrite the Venezuelan Constitution and effectively remove the legislature. Even though this was not a surprise but a core campaign pledge, as critics point out, the 1961 Constitution in fact had no provision for convoking a CA (Brewer Carias 2010). Chávez's amendment was ultimately ratified by the Supreme Court, however, and it received the support of 90 percent of those voting.

This overwhelming public mandate aside, his critics viewed the CA primarily as a means to remove a democratically elected legislature that was not of his preference. The government adopted a majority rather than proportional voting system for the CA with the result that Chávez's supporters obtained 95 percent of the seats on the basis of 60 percent of the votes. The CA then disbanded both houses of the legislature and state legislatures giving the executive unfettered control. It granted Chávez extensive decree powers and removed some 200 serving judges. The legislature subsequently passed a 2004 bill that allowed the government to appoint 12 new Supreme Court justices, establishing its influence over the judiciary.

The erosion of checks and balances on the executive continued. The government redrew the administrative map to curtail the power of governors and mayors and to supplant them with new centers of power below the municipal level that Chávez could easily control. In 2007, when a further round of constitutional amendments were narrowly rejected in a referendum, Chávez responded by introducing most of the important measures – including the one removing term limits on the Presidency – by executive decree.

Although the erosion of constraints on the executive in Peru were similar to those in

Venezuela, the implications for other rights were undoubtedly more negative in the former. Despite a high level of scrutiny, the Chávez government was not found to have committed serious human rights violations on any sort of scale. In contrast, the level of human rights violations in Peru under Fujimori was substantial. In the counterinsurgency campaign against the Maoist-inspired guerrilla movement known as *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), the postwar Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that the state badly failed to take sufficient measures to prevent the abuse of human rights. Indeed, actions taken by Fujimori made such abuses more likely.

Shortly after coming to power, Fujimori passed law 24150, which made any actions taken by the military in the course of the counterinsurgency campaign effectively nonjudicable. Commanders in the field essentially operated with impunity. By declaring a state of emergency, the Fujimori government also in effect denied those suspected of involvement in the insurgency the right to fair judicial proceedings. Suspects were tried in tribunals rather than courts, with conviction rates of 97 percent for those put on trial. Disproportionate minimum sentences were also imposed and new crimes of unclear status were introduced. Even this did not compare to the dirty war launched by the government against the Shining Path. Fujimori worked with the military to create a death squad known as *Grupo Colina* that engaged in extrajudicial executions on a significant scale (Conaghan 2005: 66-67).

Although the implications of populist rule for basic rights and freedoms were undoubtedly extreme in Peru, they fell along a continuum of pseudo-authoritarian abuses common to populist governments. The severity of the Peruvian outcome was partly the result of a chronic problem of insecurity. A similar situation manifested in Colombia, where Álvaro Uribe executed a brutal counterinsurgency war against radical insurgents in the 2000s. Like Fujirmori, Uribe had concentrated power in the executive branch, making it virtually impossible for other public or private actors to hold the government accountable.

However, not all of those regimes classified as populist have been as flagrant abusers of the law as Fujimori. Despite the rhetoric, Evo Morales of Bolivia has governed in a mostly centrist way, much as non-populist leftists like Lula did in Brazil. We could probably say the same of the successive Kirchner governments in Argentina, which moved modestly to the left in some areas of social policy, while maintaining the basic neoliberal foundations of macroeconomic stability and capitalist production.

Why have some populists then remained more democratic and relatively more respectful of the law? A partial explanation may be the binary way in which "populists" are classified in this paper. There would, we think, be little disagreement in the notion that some leaders are more populist than others. What we have in mind here is not a distinction based on the policies or practices of these populists in government. Rather, the greater institutionalization of the movements that brought Morales and the Kirchners to power made them somewhat less populist than the minimalist and ephemeral organizations behind Chávez and Fujimori's respective rises to power. When in power, Morales and the Kirchners did not feel under the same compulsion to repress the mobilization of opponents. Further research may be able to deal with this kind of nuance. The general conclusion holds, however. For most populists, the imperatives of staying in power without an institutionalized support base means that they face strong incentives to control the judiciary, curtail public dissent, and even arrest and abuse opponents.

Populism and Redistribution

Contrary to our expectations, we find that populist rule is not associated with greater redistribution than non-populist democratic rule. This is the case irrespective of whether we compare populist rule to that of the social democratic left (as we might expect) or to that of non-left democracies. That populist rule should bring about less redistribution than other democracies is surprising and greatly undermines the case for the popular support of populist campaigners.

In cases like Venezuela, where Chávez consistently based his appeal on promises of economic progress for the country's marginalized communities, this presents a particular puzzle. While those on the radical left have tended to be critical of the pro-business policies of more moderate left governments like that of Lula in Brazil, it does appear that the latter have brought about greater post-tax redistribution than the more radical alternatives. In part, this may be due to the depressing effect of left populist government on the business environment more generally. The negative association of left populist rule with property rights (partly driven by nationalizations in the natural resources sector) is indicative of this antagonism. If overall growth is lowered as a result vis-a-vis non-populist democracies, this may account for the greater de facto redistribution in the latter, where gains are directed to poorer sectors without directly taxing the wealthy.

In Venezuela, relations between Chávez and the business elite were acrimonious from the start. This came to a head in 2002, when Pedro Carmona and a clique of senior military commanders and business and media elites conspired to overthrow Chávez. Although Chávez was restored to power after just 48 hours, the political climate continued to decline. Following the coup attempt, the state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), ceased production in an attempt to force Chávez from office. After about a month, the strike had begun to weaken, but the economy had suffered a sharp contraction with Venezuelan GDP falling some 24 percent (Weisbrot 2011). Chávez responded by establishing greater control over PDVSA and forcing out thousands of its employees. The economy recovered in the years that followed, but in comparison to its pre-recession peak, overall growth was modest (Weisbrot 2011). Thus, despite major increases in social spending and significant declines in poverty rates, the aggregate effect of Chávez's period of government on redistribution was ultimately less impressive than that achieved in more moderate left regimes.

It must be noted that while Chávez has been relatively successful at redistributing toward the poor, other populists have been less successful. In fact, of the ten left-leaning

populists covered in the analysis, Chávez has achieved the single highest average redistribution level over his tenure (a 4.31 percent reduction in the Gini coefficient due to taxes and transfers). Chávez is simply not representative of all populist rulers in that regard. But even Chávez's success pales in comparison with the *average* redistribution level in non-populist left-wing democracies (4.51 percent reduction).

This is not to say that the policy packages of Lula's Brazil or Bachelet's Chile represent an optimal strategy for poverty and inequality reduction. Neither government challenged the basic liberal economic rules of the game set out in the 1990s with the result that many on the left view them with skepticism (Panizza 2009). Moreover, mass demonstrations during the recent FIFA World Cup in Brazil suggest that all is not well. However, the growth of experimental participatory institutions introduced by the state at the local level as well as local projects of resistance and reclamation that began from below in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America suggest that it may be possible to bring about substantive progress in ways that do not lead to the excessive concentration of power in the executive (Wolford 2010).

Conclusion

This paper has provided a first cut at systematically evaluating the implications of populist rule for democracy. We have broken down these outcomes into several dimensions and revealed that populism has had largely negative effects across the board. In general, populist governments erode the rule of law more than non-populist democrats when in power. This finding is robust to a thorough range of specifications. The main justification given by populists for the lack of respect for the law is that democratic legitimacy depends more on direct and participatory forms of government and on substantive socioeconomic outcomes than on mere institutional consistency or procedural rights.

However, while the participation of some groups may be enhanced under populist

government, that of others is often suppressed. Even in the best cases for this argument like Venezuela, the effects of populist government on participation were mixed. The cooptation of popular movements of resistance to the old regime by Chávez foreclosed further institutionalized opposition, and weakened rather than strengthened the vertical accountability of government. The street protests against the government of Chávez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, in 2014 were a symptom of this institutional closure.

The most surprising result probably concerns the lack of redistribution even among left-leaning populists. This may be partly explained by the indirectly negative effects of populist rule on economic growth. However, the precise explanation for this relationship is in need of further investigation.

Notes

[1]It must be noted, however, that a few studies have tested the effect of populism on redistribution (e.g., Montecino 2012).

[2]One could envisage there being *degrees of populism* according to just how flat this structure is and we discuss this possibility further in the discussion section, but for the present purposes we persist with a categorical notion of populism.

[3]Although the proponents of the ideational and organizational conceptualizations of populism stress the distinctness of their approaches, we take the view that they are in agreement on the centrality of "popular sovereignty" to populism.

[4]Since this indicator is perhaps the closest to our concept our interest but has many missing values, we have predicted the missing values using the other indicators. We ran an OLS regression in which this indicator is the dependent variable and our other measures are the independent variables. We then use the predicted values to fill in the missing values. Our results are robust to the use of only the non-predicted values of the *Rule of Law* variable (see Table A4 of the online appendix). The correlation between the non-predicted *Rule of Law* and the other indices ranges from 0.43 (*Physical Integrity*) to 0.81 (*Property Rights*). In addition, in Table A5 of the online appendix we use values that have been imputed with *Amelia II*. These values have been imputed using the other indicators of the rule of law. We include two splines of time and interact splines with cross-section. Figures A1 and A2 provide diagnostic tests of the imputation.

[5]Results with additional controls for oil production (Ross 2013) and inflation (World Bank 2013) as well as decade dummies are presented in Tables A9-A11 of the online appendix.

[6]Executive elections are presidential elections in presidential and mixed regimes, and parliamentary elections in parliamentary regimes. Results are unchanged if we restrict the analysis to presidential elections (available upon request). Models are estimated with and without the turnout in the previous election because its inclusion reduces the sample.

[7]We do not use this method to address endogeneity in the electoral turnout estimations because we have null findings. Our findings suggest that participation in executive elections in countries in which a populist party is in power (and so has won an election) is about the same as those in which a populist party had been almost elected (67.3429 vs. 67.4633; p-value= 0.9799).

[8]We did not include these control variables in all models because of missing values.

[9]The 2000 presidential election, which Fujimori won was discredited and resulted in his absconding from Peru.

[10]It is worth noting that Chávez's predecessor, Rafael Caldera was also elected as a populist in 1993 on the basis of a 48.5 percent turnout.

References

Akkerman, Agnes, Cas Mudde, and Andrej Zaslove. 2014. "How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(9): 1324-53.

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8:155-94.

Alesina, Alberto, and Edward L. Glaeser. *Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Altman, David, and Aníbal Pérez-Linán. 2002. "Assessing the quality of democracy: Freedom, competitiveness and participation in eighteen Latin American countries." *Democratization* 9(2):85-100.

Avritzer, Leonardo. 2002. *Democracy and the public space in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barr, Robert R., and Henry A. Dietz. 2006. "Fujimori and the Mayors of Lima, 1990-2001: The Impact and Legacy of Neopopulist Rule." Pp. xiii, 362 p. in *The Fujimori legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*, edited by Julio Carrion. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions." World Bank Economic Review 15(1):165-176.

Birdsall, Nancy, Nora Lustig, and Darryl McLeod. 2011. *Declining inequality in Latin America: some economics, some politics*: Center for Global Development.

Blofield, Merike (Ed.). 2011. *The great gap : inequality and the politics of redistribution in Latin America*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Boix, Carles. 2011. "Democracy, development, and the international system." *American Political Science Review* 105(04):809-28.

Brewer Carias, Allan-Randolph. 2010. *Dismantling democracy in Venezuela: the Chávez authoritarian experiment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cannon, Barry. 2009. *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian revolution: populism and democracy in a globalised age*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Canovan, Margaret. 1999. "Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy." *Political Studies* 47(1):2-16.

Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited." *Public Choice* 143(1):67-101.

Ciccariello-Maher, George. 2013. *We created Chávez: a people's history of the Venezuelan Revolution*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Cingranelli, David L, and David L Richards. 2010. "The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights data project." *Human Rights Quarterly* 32(2):401-24.

Conaghan, Catherine M. 2005. *Fujimori's Peru : deception in the public sphere*. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press ; London : Eurospan [distributor].

Coppedge, Michael. 2007. "A Classificaiton of Latin American Political Parties." in *Kellog Institute Working Paper*. South Bend: University of Notre Dame.

Coppedge, Michael. 2012. *Democratization and research methods*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cornia, Giovanni Andrea. 2012. "Inequality trends and their determinants." *World Institute for Development Economics Research Working Paper No 9*.

Cornia, Giovanni Andrea (Ed.). 2014. *Falling inequality in Latin America : policy changes and lessons*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Crick, Bernard. 2005. "Populism, politics and democracy." *Democratisation* 12(5):625-32.

Crook, Richard Charles, and James Manor. 1998. *Democracy and decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa : participation, accountability, and performance*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Robert Alan. 1989. *Democracy and its critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastian Edwards (Eds.). 1991. *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Doyle, David. 2011. "The Legitimacy of Political Institutions." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(11):1447-73.

Dunning, Thad. 2012. *Natural experiments in the social sciences: a design-based approach*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ellner, S. 2003. "Introduction: The Search for Explanations." Pp. x, 257 p. in *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: class, polarization, and conflict*, edited by Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. Boulder: L. Rienner.

Goldfrank, Benjamin. 2011. *Deepening local democracy in Latin America: participation, decentralization, and the left*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Hawkins, K.A. 2009. "Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(8):1040-67.

Hawkins, Kirk A. 2010. "Who Mobilizes? Participatory Democracy in Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution." *Latin American Politics and Society* 52(3):31-66.

Heller, Patrick. 2000. "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India." *World Politics* 52(4):484-519.

Honaker, James, Gary King and Matthew Blackwell. 2011. "Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data." *Journal of Statistical Software* 45 (7):1-47.

Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2012. *Democracy and the left: social policy and inequality in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2014. "Unified Database." edited by Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Stockholm, Sweden.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* (5430).

Keefer, Philip, and Stephen Knack. 2002. "Polarization, politics and property rights: Links between inequality and growth." *Public Choice* 111(1-2):127-54.

Kenworthy, Lane, and Jonas Pontusson. 2005. "Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries." *Perspectives on Politics* 3(3):44972.

Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. "Populism: What's in a Name?" Pp. 358 p. in *Populism and the mirror of democracy*, edited by Francisco Panizza. New York: Verso.

Levitsky, Steven, and James Loxton. 2013. "Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism: The case of Fujimori's Peru." in *Populism in Europe and the Americas: threat or corrective for democracy?*, edited by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M. Roberts. 2011. "Latin America's "Left Turn": A Framework for analysis." Pp. xiii, 480 p. in *The resurgence of the Latin American left*, edited by Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linzer, Drew A. and Jeffrey K. Staton. 2012. "A Measurement Model for Synthesizing

Multiple Comparative Indicators: The Case of Judicial Independence." Emory University.

Loffredo, Stephen. 1993. "Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law." University of Pennsylvania Law Review:1277-389.

López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Lustig. 2010. *Declining inequality in Latin America: a decade of progress?* Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Mainwaring, Scott. 2012. "From Representative Democracy to Participatory Competitive Authoritarianism: Hugo Chávez and Venezuelan Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(04):955-67.

Mair, Peter. 2002. "Populist democracy vs party democracy." Pp. 81-98 in *Democracies and the populist challenge*, edited by Yves Meny and Yves Surel. Houndsmills: Palgrave.

McLeod, Darryl, and Nora Lustig. 2011. "Inequality and Poverty under Latin America's New Left Regimes." *Tulane Economics Working Paper Series* 1117.

Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5): 914-927.

Moene, Karl Ove, and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. "Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 95(4):859-74.

Montecino, Juan Antonio. 2012. "Decreasing inequality under Latin America's social democratic and populist governments: is the difference real?" *International Journal of Health Services* 42(2):257-75.

Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The populist zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39(4):542-63.

Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.). 2013. *Populism in Europe and the Americas: threat or corrective for democracy?* New York: Cambrdige University Press.

Panizza, Francisco. 2005. "Introduction: Populism and the mirror of democracy." Pp. 358 p. in *Populism and the mirror of democracy*, edited by Francisco Panizza. London ; New York, NY: Verso.

Panizza, Francisco. 2009. *Contemporary Latin America: development and democracy beyond the Washington consensus*. London: Zed.

Perotti, Roberto. 1996. "Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the data say." *Journal of Economic Growth* 1(2): 149-87.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2009. *From economic crisis to reform: IMF programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe*. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1999. "Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense." Pp. 23 in *Democracy's Value*, edited by Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordn. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Regan, P., and D Clark. 2010. "The Institutions and Elections Project." Binghamton University.

Remmer, Karen L. 2011. "The Rise of LeftistPopulist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change." *Comparative Political Studies*. 45(8):947-72.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2013. "Populism and Democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez." in *Populism in Europe and the Americas: threat or corrective for democracy?*, edited by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 1995. "Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: the Peruvian case." *World Politics* 48(1):82-116.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2007. "Latin America's Populist Revival." *SAIS Review* 27(1):3-15.

Ross, Michael. 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4):860-74.

Ross, Michael. 2013. "Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2011." http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross (June 10, 2014).

Salamanca, Luis. 2004. "Civil Society: Late Bloomers." Pp. xx, 342 p. in *The unraveling of representative democracy in Venezuela*, edited by Jennifer McCoy and David J. Myers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Segura-Ubiergo, Alex. 2007. *The political economy of the welfare state in Latin America: globalization, democracy, and development*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shapiro, Ian. 1999. *Democratic justice*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Shils, Edward. 1956. *The torment of secrecy; the background and consequences of American security policies*. Melbourne,: W. Heinemann.

Solt, Frederick. 2009 [2013]. "Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database." *Social Science Quarterly* 90(2):231-242.

Sovey, Allison J. and Donald P. Green. 2010. "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Politi-

cal Science: A Readers' Guide." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55(1):188-200.

Staiger, Douglas, and James H Stock. 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments." *Econometrica* 65(3):557-86.

Tanaka, Martin. 1998. *Los espejismos de la democracia: el colapso del sistema de partidos en el Peru, 1980-1995, en perspectiva comparada*. Lima, Peru: IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Treisman, Daniel. 2007. *The architecture of government: rethinking political decentralization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Trivino Salazar, Juan Carlos. 2013. "The promise of transformation through participation: an analysis of Communal Councils in Caracas, Venezuela." in *International Institute for Social Studies*. Rotterdam.

Urbinati, Nadia. 1998. "Democracy and populism." *Constellations* 5(1):110-24.

Weingast, B.R. 1997. "The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law." *American Political Science Review* 91(2):245-63.

Weisbrot, Mark. 2011. "Venezuela in the Chávez Years: Its Economy and Influence on the Region." Pp. vi, 338 p. in *The revolution in Venezuela : social and political change under Chávezvez*, edited by Thomas Ponniah and Jonathan Eastwood. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies : Distributed by Harvard University Press.

Weyland, Kurt. 2001. "Clarifying a contested concept: populism in the study of Latin American politics." *Comparative politics* 34(1):1-22.

Weyland, Kurt. 2003. "Latin American Neopopulism." Third World Quarterly 24(6):1095-115.

Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. 2009. "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Dataset." *American Sociological Review* 74(2):316-37.

Wolford, Wendy. 2010. *This land is ours now: social mobilization and the meanings of land in Brazil*. Durham NC: Duke University Press.

Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. *Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

World Bank, The. 2013. "World Development Indicators." Washington, DC: The World Bank Group.

Figures and Tables

Table 1: Effect of Populism on Electoral Turnout

	Executive Elections				Legislative Elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Lagged DV	.811 (.066)***		.811 (.066)***		.753 (.066)***		.751 (.067)***	
Pop. in power	.031 (2.435)	-2.673 (3.604)			.861 (2.925)	-2.354 (3.892)		
Pop. elected			.182 (2.456)	-1.958 (3.278)			-.319 (2.577)	-2.966 (3.373)
Compulsory	-1.011 (1.565)	5.253 (2.220)**	-1.026 (1.562)	5.393 (2.209)**	.032 (1.701)	3.824 (2.203)*	.155 (1.717)	3.989 (2.210)*
GDP pc	4.185 (1.353)***	10.157 (1.784)***	4.187 (1.351)***	10.129 (1.787)***	4.087 (1.618)**	7.859 (1.792)***	4.133 (1.606)**	7.827 (1.780)***
Growth	.371 (.140)***	.478 (.174)***	.371 (.140)***	.458 (.175)***	.043 (.204)	.145 (.237)	.051 (.200)	.139 (.235)
Ethnic div.	4.140 (3.795)	-3.637 (4.773)	4.088 (3.774)	-3.498 (4.858)	-.354 (4.186)	-10.503 (4.944)**	-.259 (4.172)	-10.016 (4.925)**
N	156	174	156	174	190	208	190	208
R2	.681	.217	.681	.217	.576	.125	.576	.127

Note: OLS estimations. Columns 1-2 tests H.1 for executive elections and columns 5-6 for legislative elections. Columns 3-4 tests H.2 for executive elections and columns 7-8 for legislative elections. Turnout in first round elections. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table 2: Effect of Populism on the Rule of Law

	Rule of Law	Exec. Const.	Indep. Judic. (CIRI)	Indep. Judic. (L&S)	Free Press	Human Rights	Phys. Integ.	Prop. Rights
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Lagged DV	.712	.769	.750	.984	.843	.821	.775	.944
	(.026)***	(.051)***	(.028)***	(.004)***	(.026)***	(.020)***	(.022)***	(.020)***
Populist	-.054	-.038	-.095	-.006	-.090	-.030	-.041	-.011
	(.010)***	(.013)***	(.027)***	(.003)**	(.020)***	(.016)*	(.018)**	(.008)
Autocracy	-.014	-.126	-.032	.005	-.078	-.049	-.042	-.020
	(.014)	(.035)***	(.034)	(.003)*	(.021)***	(.019)***	(.024)*	(.020)
GDP pc	.039	.012	.053	-.0005	.012	.011	.002	.009
	(.006)***	(.008)	(.012)***	(.001)	(.007)*	(.007)	(.009)	(.006)
Growth	-.0009	-.0006	-.001	.0001	.0001	.0004	.0006	.001
	(.0006)	(.001)	(.002)	(.0001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.0007)*
Ethnic div.	-.048	-.030	-.054	-.013	-.010	-.056	-.057	-.033
	(.015)***	(.021)	(.035)	(.004)***	(.022)	(.024)**	(.030)*	(.015)**
N	913	622	883	922	941	846	685	455
R2	.717	.865	.67	.994	.822	.75	.687	.938

Note: OLS estimations. Tests the effect of populism on the rule of law (H.3). *Independence of Judiciary (CIRI)* uses the data on the independence of the judiciary of Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) and *Independence of Judiciary (L&S)* uses that of Linzer and Staton (2012). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table 3: Effect of Populism on Redistribution

	All Governm.		Only Left Governm.	Excl. Left Democracies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pre-tax Gini	.025	.038	-.049	.103
	(.029)	(.030)	(.049)	(.034)***
Populist	-1.804			
	(.239)***			
Left Populist		-1.014	-1.386	-.800
		(.286)***	(.392)***	(.303)***
Right Populist		-2.687		-2.791
		(.357)***		(.344)***
Autocracy	-.266	-.253	-1.775	-.231
	(.362)	(.362)	(.371)***	(.364)
GDP pc	1.782	1.849	.289	2.309
	(.191)***	(.191)***	(.313)	(.205)***
Growth	-.106	-.109	-.116	-.100
	(.027)***	(.027)***	(.051)**	(.025)***
Ethnic div.	-3.781	-3.861	-4.638	-3.907
	(.604)***	(.601)***	(1.260)***	(.587)***
N	599	599	207	455
R2	.229	.233	.155	.328

Note: OLS estimations. Tests the effect of populism on redistribution (H.4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table 4: Instrumental Variable Analysis of the Effect of Populism on Electoral Turnout

	Executive Elections				Legislative Elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Lagged DV	.812 (.063)***		.810 (.063)***		.743 (.067)***		.744 (.067)***	
Pop. in Power	1.105 (3.924)	-9.197 (6.970)			-4.679 (5.398)	-20.118 (8.676)**		
Pop. Elected			-.308 (4.578)	-8.318 (6.145)			-3.933 (5.710)	-16.878 (7.942)**
Compulsory	-1.020 (1.534)	5.252 (2.194)**	-.984 (1.551)	5.845 (2.177)***	.536 (1.799)	5.125 (2.363)**	.657 (1.916)	5.572 (2.408)**
GDP pc	4.173 (1.330)***	10.188 (1.760)***	4.182 (1.315)***	10.080 (1.758)***	4.332 (1.568)***	8.468 (1.792)***	4.221 (1.563)***	8.057 (1.741)***
Growth	.365 (.138)***	.516 (.168)***	.370 (.137)***	.447 (.175)**	.087 (.186)	.296 (.220)	.061 (.186)	.207 (.218)
Ethnic div.	3.928 (3.797)	-2.385 (4.988)	4.243 (4.113)	-1.378 (5.333)	-.161 (4.143)	-9.376 (5.163)*	.482 (4.300)	-7.029 (5.221)
Anderson-Rubin test of stat. sign. of populism	[.777]	[.176]	[.946]	[.162]	[.382]	[.008]	[.488]	[.02]
N	156	174	156	174	190	208	190	208
R2	.681	.202	.681	.197	.565	.015	.57	.045

Note: Two-Stage probit least square estimations. See section 2 of the online appendix for more information on the estimation procedure, and Table A22 for the first stage regressions. Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance reports a test of the effect of populism on turnout that is robust to weak instruments. Turnout in first round elections. Robust standard errors in parentheses. P-values in brackets. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table 5: Instrumental Variable Analysis of the Effect of Populism on the Rule of Law and Redistribution

	Rule of Law	Exec. Const.	Indep. Judic. (CIRI)	Indep. Judic. (L&S)	Free Press	Human Rights	Phys. Integ.	Prop. Rights	Redistribution
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Lagged DV	.691	.778	.715	.983	.831	.794	.756	.937	
	(.032)***	(.051)***	(.035)***	(.006)***	(.032)***	(.025)***	(.029)***	(.024)***	
Populist	-.080	-.013	-.201	-.008	-.122	-.112	-.102	-.018	-1.405
	(.023)***	(.020)	(.062)***	(.007)	(.046)***	(.046)**	(.050)**	(.013)	(.591)**
Autocracy	-.017	-.117	-.047	.005	-.087	-.062	-.053	-.022	-.205
	(.014)	(.034)***	(.034)	(.003)	(.025)***	(.019)***	(.026)**	(.020)	(.368)
Pre-tax Gini									.028
									(.029)
GDP pc	.041	.010	.060	-.0003	.014	.014	.003	.010	1.795
	(.006)***	(.008)	(.013)***	(.002)	(.007)**	(.007)**	(.009)	(.006)*	(.188)***
Growth	-.0009	-.0007	-.002	.0001	.0002	.0006	.0006	.001	-.106
	(.0006)	(.001)	(.002)	(.0001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.0007)*	(.027)***
Ethnic div.	-.047	-.032	-.043	-.013	-.005	-.051	-.054	-.033	-3.873
	(.015)***	(.020)	(.036)	(.004)***	(.022)	(.024)**	(.030)*	(.014)**	(.604)***
Anderson-Rubin test of stat. sign. of populism	[.001]	[.516]	[.001]	[.284]	[.011]	[.012]	[.042]	[.168]	[.026]
N	913	622	883	922	941	846	685	455	599
R2	.715	.864	.663	.994	.821	.741	.682	.938	.227


Note: Two-Stage probit least square estimations. See section 2 of the online appendix for more information on the estimation procedure, and Table A23 for the first stage regressions. Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance reports a test of the effect of populism on turnout that is robust to weak instruments. *Independence of Judiciary (CIRI)* uses the data on the independence of the judiciary of Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) and *Independence of Judiciary (L&S)* uses that of Linzer and Staton (2012). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table 6: T-Tests of the Difference between Populist Regimes and those in which Populist Parties were Almost Elected

	Mean								
	Rule of Law	Exec. Const.	Indep. Judic. (CIRI)	Indep. Judic. (L&S)	Free Press	Human Rights	Phys. Integ.	Prop. Rights	Redistribution
Populist	.3183	.7694	.3448	.4493	.4604	.3092	.4397	.4876	2.8702
Almost Populist	.3561	.9469	.4221	.5533	.6829	.3914	.6218	.5915	3.1658
T-Test of the Difference	2.3055**	7.7877***	1.7642**	5.2533***	5.1834***	3.3568***	5.4565***	3.6211**	1.0739

Note: *Almost populist* governments are defined as democracies in which a populist party has received at least 20 percent of the vote. *Independence of Judiciary (CIRI)* uses the data on the independence of the judiciary of Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) and *Independence of Judiciary (L&S)* uses that of Linzer and Staton (2012). ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Figure 1: The Rule of Law under Autocracy, Democracy and Populism



Note: *Independence of Judiciary (CIRI)* uses the data on the independence of the judiciary of Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) and *Independence of Judiciary (L&S)* uses that of Linzer and Staton (2012).